The Visegrad Group: A Geopolitical Battleground between China and Taiwan

Today, the Visegrad Group (V4) finds itself at the centre of a new geopolitical rivalry, this time between the Western bloc, led by the U.S. and the EU, and the expanding BRICS+ alliance, primarily composed of Russia and China. One of the defining political developments of recent decades has been the gradual eastward expansion of the European Union, with Central European nations joining in parallel with the development of EU institutions and norms.

The competition between great powers has once again intensified in Central Europe, a shift precipitated by the COVID-19 crisis. As countries scrambled to secure vaccines and medical supplies, a clear geopolitical divide emerged: the EU's vaccine rollout versus Chinese and Russian alternatives. Since 2013, China has sought to increase its influence in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, leveraging its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to enhance economic connectivity and to gain political leverage, particularly within EU institutions. The war in Ukraine has further exacerbated this competition, as Chinese investments in the region grow, alongside trade disputes—especially concerning electric vehicles.

The Chinese Strategy: A Multifaceted Approach

China's strategy for gaining influence in Eastern Europe, particularly through the Visegrad Group, is multi-dimensional. At its core lies a discursive element. Chinese political communication emphasises the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, “Harmonious World”, “Peaceful Rise”, and “Peaceful Development”. These principles promote ideas of non-interference, mutual economic development, and pluralism, arguing that economic advancement should not be conditional upon political reforms, such as those advocated by the West—namely, human rights and liberal democracy. Instead, China asserts that every country should have access to development, irrespective of its domestic political system, as enshrined in the UN Charter.

This rhetoric, which underpins Chinese investment in the region, stands in stark contrast to the EU’s approach, which often ties economic aid to political change. A case in point is Serbia, which in 2023 signed a free trade agreement with China while maintaining a vague stance on its EU aspirations. The EU, in turn, has developed a clear narrative: countries must choose between the BRICS and the EU’s economic architecture.

This discourse, while not new, has gained traction in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly after China’s controversial mass quarantine policies. The human rights debate has also been a consistent point of contention, with European countries often highlighting China’s violations in this area. These tensions have shifted the dynamics of the 17+1 Forum—a platform for cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries. Since 2021, the forum has grown increasingly confrontational, with Central European members accusing Beijing of failing to honour its commitments and using economic leverage solely to advance China’s strategic goals. Lithuania withdrew from the forum in 2021, followed by Latvia and Estonia in August 2022.

In response, Beijing has adjusted its approach, focusing on countries that are more receptive to its overtures—either due to dissatisfaction with the EU (such as Hungary) or because of domestic political shifts (Greece, Serbia). The red line for China being the recognition of the One China Policy and having a “fair approach” regarding Chinese domestic politics and not concentrating foreign policy on the situation of ethnic minorities in China. 

The Paradox of the Visegrad Group

Despite this increasing focus, a key question remains: why does China invest diplomatic energy and resources into the Visegrad Group countries, given their limited economic importance to China in terms of exports or foreign investments? There are three primary reasons.

The first is economic. While the V4 countries may not be critical markets for Chinese exports, they often function as sub-contractors for German industry, which is a major economic partner for China and a central political force within the EU. As such, maintaining good relations with the Visegrad Group offers China leverage over Germany and, by extension, influence within the EU.

The second reason is geopolitical. China is financing a bold infrastructure project, supported by Greece and Hungary, which envisions a 650-kilometre canal linking the Danube River to the Aegean Sea. This canal would be of significant strategic importance, as it would allow Chinese exports to bypass the Bosphorus Strait and the heavily trafficked Mediterranean and English Channel, reducing costs and transit time. Furthermore, the canal would be controlled by countries with strong ties to China—Greece, Serbia, and Hungary—giving Beijing additional leverage over European trade routes.

Finally, China seeks to consolidate its “One-China” policy by reducing the international presence of the Republic of China (Taipei). Taiwan has cultivated diplomatic and economic ties with several Baltic and Central European nations, many of which are closely aligned with the United States. Securing the Visegrad Group’s support is therefore crucial to China’s broader strategy of diminishing Taipei's influence on the global stage.

Strategic Implications

In the current geopolitical climate, marked by uncertainty over the future of NATO and the return of Donald Trump to the White House, Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative offers European countries (whether or not EU member) additional development opportunities. As a result, it is a valuable lever for China to exert influence within the EU. As the Visegrad Group nations become increasingly polarised in their foreign policy alignments, China is positioning itself as a counterbalance to EU power and, at the very least, as a disruptive force regarding the liberal EU project. So far, it seems that the EU institutions, especially the EU Commission has chosen to view China as a major disruptive force, given the discursive tone the EU commission takes when it comes to comments on Chinese investments in Eastern Europe and in the Balkans. This view has seen more vocal expression since the Novi Sad railway station incident in Serbia, where the roof of the station collapsed, resulting in 14 casualties; the station was renovated by a consortium of Chinese companies. Whether Beijing will succeed in consolidating its influence in the region remains uncertain; its strategic investments, particularly in infrastructure and political partnerships (China has made explicit its preference for investing in countries that are—or try to be—geopolitically neutral,  alignment to the U.S. being unattractive), however make it a key player in the shifting dynamics of Central and Eastern Europe.