This strategy has extended beyond Hungary’s borders, influencing political developments in neighboring Visegrád Group (V4) countries, notably Poland and Slovakia, as well as in the United States, where the “Hungarian model” is praised by many in the Christian right.
Nonetheless, Orbán’s policies have been widely criticized in the rest of the Western world as warning signs of “illiberalism” and “democratic backsliding”, with educated elites failing to understand that this kind of politics resonates with segments of the populations in Central Europe, where historical experiences of state intervention and nationalism remain deeply ingrained.
The Ideological Foundations of Orbán’s Paternalism
Despite claims that Orbán and his supporters lack ideology and use contrarian conservative discourse as a smokescreen for government corruption, his brand of paternalist politics is rooted in a Hungarian historical narrative that emphasizes the role of the state as a guardian of national identity and economic stability.
This reflects the centuries-old “Doctrine of the Holy Crown of Hungary,” in which the crown and country are inseparable, and the ruler governs in its name, bearing a duty to safeguard its defense and common good, recalling the Machiavellian understanding of the common good, understood as making the largest possible number of the population content with their ruler.
It also aligns with what Hungarian professor and Orbán critic Zsolt Enyedi defines as “civilisationist ethnocentrism”, where the state positions itself as the defender of cultural homogeneity and national sovereignty based on an explicitly Christian conception of politics.
Under these two seemingly dissimilar ideas, Orbán has built a framework for paternalistic conservatism reminiscent of historical examples such as Benjamin Disraeli’s One Nation Toryism or Otto von Bismarck’s State Socialism, adapted to contemporary circumstances.
Hungarian Paternalism and Economic Policy: The Result of Orbán’s ”Centaur State”
Orbán’s economic governance is characterized by selective state intervention, which another critic, Bálint Misetics, describes as a “centaur state”—liberal at the top, paternalistic at the bottom.
Under Orbán, the Hungarian government has pursued centralised economic policies favoring socially conservative goals, helping certain groups while rejecting the traditional welfare state in favor of a so-called work-based society.
The flat personal income tax system, corporate-friendly policies, and selective pro-natalist welfare initiatives, such as maternity benefits, baby bonds, tax cuts, and interest-free loans for married couples, have benefited traditional families, many in the middle class, while the working class and unemployed face reduced social security nets and restrictive labor policies.
These tradeoffs seem minor compared to the positive results of Hungary’s family support system, which has driven a growing fertility rate compared to the declining trend in the rest of Europe.
Moreover, through these paternalist policies, Orbán has cultivated a loyal electorate, strong in every Hungarian county except Budapest, which has become a progressive stronghold in an otherwise conservative country.
A similar approach was implemented in Poland under the last Law and Justice Party (PiS) government, with generous family benefits such as the “500+” program, which provided direct financial support to all families with children regardless of income.
PiS openly acknowledged Orbán’s influence in their own family policy, coordinating policies with the Hungarian government at cabinet-level meetings, but with the return of the more liberal-leaning Civic Platform to power, social policies have shifted toward alignment with the European Union, though the “500+” program remains due to its popularity.
Paternalism Beyond Borders, but only for Hungarians
Orbán’s government reignited a century-old debate about the fairness of the Treaty of Trianon which saw ethnic Hungarians displacement, when it lent support to those living abroad in the West as well as to large Hungarian minorities in Slovakia, Romania, and Ukraine.
Through policies such as dual citizenship and extended voting rights, Hungary has bolstered its influence in the region; adding a shared ideological struggle against EU interference in conservative domestic politics has led to Slovakia’s recent authorization of dual Slovakian-Hungarian citizenship for Hungarian families in Slovakia—a historic reversal of a policy Slovakia had rejected for decades.
This has become possible due to Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico warming up to Orbán’s way of seeing things after years of positioning himself as a left-wing leader, which resulted in him allowing many Slovakian Hungarians to benefit from Hungarian family policy grants previously available only to residents of Hungary—a benefit to not only this population, but both leaders as well, as it has garnered them loyal voters.
The reactions of other neighbours, namely Romania and Ukraine, have been much less favourable to Orbán’s policies when it comes to their own Székely and Transcarpathian Hungarian minorities, characterizing them as encroachments into their sovereignty.
These were however hailed by the Transylvanian Székelyföld semi-autonomous enclave in Romania. The Zelenskyy government in Ukraine in particular has lambasted such efforts, as it has imposed Ukrainization efforts (affecting the Berehove region in particular), a policy adopted by the country as part of its war strategy against Russia.
Orbán’s Vision: a new, conservative Tengerköz backed by Trump’s America
Orbán has long positioned himself as the ideological counterweight to Brussels, arguing that Hungary represents an alternative model of governance beyond Hungary’s borders, one that champions national sovereignty, traditional values, and economic paternalism to benefit fellow countrymen in exchange for loyalty to the project he represents.
With growing discontent toward EU directives in parts of Central Europe, Orbán envisions himself at the helm of a regional realignment; bringing together countries from the Visegrád 4 and even former Habsburg domains like Austria and Croatia—it is no coincidence that he employs members of the House of Habsburg as top diplomats—into what could become a new Mitteleuropa or Intermarium bloc (Tengerköz in Hungarian), that is, as a bulwark against what he calls Brussels’ “progressive imperialism”.
Donald Trump’s return to the White House could embolden this vision, as his new administration might be more willing to challenge EU overreach and support Central European leaders who share Orbán’s paternalistic methods and aversion to transnational governance.
This likely U.S.-Hungary alignment would not be unprecedented, as figures in Trump’s orbit, including Vice President J.D. Vance and loyal supporter Tucker Carlson, have praised Orbán’s paternalist policies and lauded his vision of Hungary as a model for America, reinforcing the notion that “Orbánism” is not just a European phenomenon but part of a broader ideological struggle against global liberalism.
Should Trump formally embrace Hungary as a key ally in Europe, Orbán could leverage American diplomatic and economic support to pressure Brussels and encourage more EU member states to defy integrationist policies, marking a significant shift in the balance of power within Europe, as Hungary—long seen as an outlier—could become the nucleus of a U.S.-backed conservative counterweight to the EU’s liberal consensus.
Whether this translates into tangible policy changes across the region will depend on how far Orbán might be willing to accept American influence to reshape European politics in Hungary’s favor.