Quo Vadis, Germany?

On February 13th, an Afghan attacker ploughed his car into a crowd in Munich. It was not the first such incident in Germany’s 2025 federal election campaign. Just months earlier, in December, a Saudi Arabian migrant had driven a car into a Christmas market in Magdeburg, killing six and injuring 299. At the Munich Security Conference, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance directly addressed the recent violence, calling mass migration the most urgent challenge of our time. Emphasising that democracy rests on the “sacred principle” of the people's voice, he rejected the notion of political firewalls against the so-called far-right. Notably, instead of meeting with Social-democrat chancellor Olaf Scholz, he chose to sit down with the Christian-democrat main contender Friedrich Merz—and with Alice Weidel, leader of the populist party AfD. In a country still shaped by Angela Merkel’s 2015 migration policies, such events might have been game-changers—comparable, perhaps, to the attempts on Donald Trump’s life in the U.S. election the previous year.

Yet nothing of the sort has happened. The so-called ‘firewall’—the strategy of cordoning off the populist right Alternative for Germany (AfD) from mainstream political discourse—remains firmly in place. The party, with its anti-migration and Eurosceptic platform, is expected to perform well at the ballot box, likely securing between 20% and 25% of the vote, making it the second-largest force after the centrist Christian Democrats (CDU). Yet, due to the political quarantine imposed by the other parties, these seats will be largely inconsequential. If anything, the mainstream parties, are likely to close ranks even further.

The Wrong Man for the Wrong Era

The man best positioned to become Germany’s next chancellor is Friedrich Merz, leader of the CDU. The Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens are floundering, meaning the left has little hope of forming a governing coalition without him. Memories of the failed ‘traffic light’ coalition—uniting the SPD, Greens, and the liberal Free Democrats (FDP)—are still fresh in voters’ minds. But even if he secures the chancellorship, Merz will be left with a fragile parliamentary composition. For many voters, the AfD remains the only real ‘alternative,’ given that a vote for the CDU could inadvertently restore the very left-wing parties they seek to oust. This is not the only reason why the campaign is proceeding along rigid, predetermined tracks—like a Deutsche Bahn train bound for political stagnation.

Since the collapse of the ‘traffic light’ coalition in November 2024, a questionable parliamentary agreement has been in place between the opposition and the remnants of the left-wing government. The CDU pledged not to push through any parliamentary initiatives with votes from the AfD, even when it could have used them to pass conservative policies which it agreed with. Merz had a brief window of opportunity to enact a return to nuclear power, repeal gender self-identification laws, introduce an economic stimulus package, and implement stricter migration controls. CDU and CSU ( the CDU’s regional Bavarian “sister party”) votes, combined with those of the FDP and AfD, would have been sufficient. He could have reshaped Germany’s political landscape before a single vote was cast.

None of this materialised. Merz was unwilling to accept any scenario where his party’s agenda depended on AfD support, now or in the future. Only briefly, that resolve wavered. Following the murder of a toddler in Aschaffenburg by an asylum seeker, he attempted to introduce tougher immigration laws—even at the risk of relying on AfD votes. The backlash was swift and severe. The media went into overdrive. Radical left-wing activists occupied CDU offices, as the SPD and Greens accused Merz of undermining democracy, with some drawing parallels to Hitler’s rise to power in 1933. Shaken, Merz reaffirmed the ‘firewall’ and ruled out any cooperation with the AfD, even in a minority government.

This political theatre offers a preview of Germany’s likely future. As opposition leader, Merz proved incapable of forging a broad centre-right bloc. Instead, he repeatedly extended a hand to the SPD and Greens, knowing that he would have to rely on at least one of them to govern. The FDP, historically the CDU’s preferred coalition partner, may fail to cross the 5% threshold to enter parliament. Even if it scrapes through, it is likely to be too weak to play more than a junior role in a so-called ‘Germany coalition’ of the CDU, SPD, and FDP.

Entrenched Deep State

Merz, a political outsider for years before his return, lacks a strong personal power base within his own party. Beyond the CDU’s parliamentary caucus, he faces opposition from the federal system’s powerful state premiers—political barons whose influence resembles that of the feudal princes of the Holy Roman Empire. These regional leaders will be crucial power brokers, even if they nominally belong to his own party.

Among them are the ‘Merkelites,’ who seek to maintain the CDU’s green agenda: Hendrik Wüst (North Rhine-Westphalia) and Daniel Günther (Schleswig-Holstein) govern in coalitions with the Greens and have no interest in disrupting their fragile arrangements. They also wield influence in the Bundesrat, Germany’s representation of the federated states, where they could dilute or delay conservative policies. Meanwhile, in Bavaria, Merz faces a rival in Markus Söder, an ambitious politician with his own designs on the chancellorship. Known for his opportunism, Söder has a chameleon-like ability to shift ideological positions when expedient.

A Chancellor Merz will therefore be constrained not only by his ideological opponents but also by divisions within his own party. Germany is set for an era of incrementalism. His ability to govern will hinge on electoral arithmetic. Several small parties, including the FDP, the far-left BSW, and the post-communist Left Party, are hovering around the 5% threshold. If all three fall short, parliament will have just four groups, making coalition-building simpler. If they all enter, it will be seven—a recipe for unwieldy, unstable government. Even the last three-party coalition proved fractious and ineffective.

And even before any vote is cast, the outcome is clear: Germany will struggle to address its most pressing challenges. The political class remains fixated on patching up Merkel’s legacy—her energy transition, migration policies, and EU diplomacy—while external shocks mount. The return of Donald Trump is an earthquake for which Berlin has no contingency plan. The foreign policy establishment issues declarations about adjusting to a new world order but offers no substantive solutions. Rapid advances in artificial intelligence and other technologies are transforming society, yet policymakers resemble pensioners reminiscing about the past, responding with new regulations rather than innovation.

In with the New

The political landscape is also marked by a generational shift. The rising figures on the global right—Giorgia Meloni, Javier Milei, and even Elon Musk—belong to Generation X. Younger leaders like JD Vance and Sam Altman are millennials. Trump,despite being of advanced age, has surrounded himself with a surprisingly youthful and energetic team. The supposed ‘far-right resurgence’ sweeping the world is, in reality, an overdue generational turnover, long obstructed by the dominant baby-boomer elite. That Merkel, Scholz, and Merz all belong to this ageing cohort is no coincidence.

Meanwhile, the German electorate yearns for the stability of the grand coalition era, hoping to return to a comfortable period of relative prosperity, but also of stagnation. Many still believe, wrongly, in a green utopia, as they dream of preserving the country’s generous welfare state while being blind to the crises of their own making. “The French and the Russians own the land, the British rule the seas, but we Germans reign supreme in the air—of dreams,” Heinrich Heine wrote of his compatriots in the 19th century. That dream risks becoming a nightmare if Germany finds itself once again the sick man of Europe, to the detriment of not just itself, but the entire continent.