Germany and the U.S.: A Tale of Love and Loathing

Germany, a long-time partner in trade and security, has greatly benefitted from mutual cooperation in the past, but Trump’s movement sees the partnership more as an abusive relationship than a functional marriage. With Trump in the White House the alliance appears strained, but a right-wing surge in Germany’s upcoming election could reverse course. 

Friends with Benefits

The relationship between the United States and Germany has largely revolved around their shared geopolitical goals and mutual trade obligations. Both nations have remained core members of NATO since the early years of the alliance, with the U.S. being a founding member since 1949 and Germany a reliable partner for seven decades now. The Ukraine-Russia war has been a largely unifying endeavor in recent years as both countries have backed Ukraine’s defense, though there remains a disparity between Germany’s signalled and realised material support. In November 2024 Steven Sokol, President of the American Council on Germany, expressed solidarity between the nations: “Germany has been, and remains, one of our closest allies and most steadfast security partners.” ^[1] Economically, the U.S. is Germany’s largest trading partner, and the U.S. benefits greatly from the sizable foreign investment of renewable energy technologies spearheaded by the central-European state as well as the nearly one million American jobs brought by subsidiaries of German companies.

Straining the Relationship

Though their alliance looks great on paper, the reality is more complicated. For one, Germany’s dependence on exports could lead to economic woes as Trump, fresh off an executive order imposing tariffs on Canada, China, and Mexico, promises tariffs on the EU, too. Trump stated in January: “Am I going to impose tariffs on the European Union? Do you want the truthful answer or should I give you a political answer? Absolutely, absolutely.” ^[2] With nearly 10% of German exports arriving on American shores, a tariff might destabilise an increasingly shaky relationship between the long-time allies ^[3].  

On the security front, “America First” supporters view the U.S.-German relationship as too lopsided. Washington’s NATO contribution, the largest of any member, far outweighs Berlin's meager support. Though Germany met NATO's target of 2% GDP allocation on defence in 2024, it’s still well-short of U.S. President Donald Trump's previous calls for as much as 5% and comes only after years of falling short of the NATO target. ^[4] Trump’s movement questions the disparity between U.S. and EU commitments to NATO and poses the question: Is the EU, Germany included, free-loading, and using American taxpayer money to do it? The question becomes more pertinent when one considers that support for the ongoing Ukraine War remains polarising among those taxpayers ^[5]. Trump has repeatedly threatened to withdraw American support from NATO completely, a move which would cause upheaval in Germany (and Europe in general), forcing a realignment of military expenditure.

From the German perspective, U.S. dominance of NATO has historically empowered the country to sway German policies — this aspect of the relationship leaves Germany feeling like the abused partner. Trump’s threats of NATO withdrawal surely upset many Germans as the overwhelming majority (82%) believe the alliance is ”important for securing peace in Europe” ^[6].

Washington’s outsized cultural influence and use of their market dominance gives them significant leverage over European policies, too. For example, the U.S. has advocated for decreased European dependence on Russian energy and pushed for European nations to buy American gas ^[7]. Furthermore, America’s increasingly anti-China policy has pressured the EU to economically sanction the Asian power, though Germany in particular remains reluctant due to its heavy dependence on Chinese profits ^[8]. 

While the prevailing American view of German relations remains consistently positive over the last 8 years, the German view correlates directly with who sits in the White House. Under Trump, nearly 79% of polled Germans viewed the U.S.-German relationship as “bad”. Just a year later under President Biden, this percentage dropped to just 24%. Now with Trump back in the White House, perceptions will likely shift again, as Germans take a more negative view of the international relationship. However, German public opinion could be poised for a major shift in the light of a rising German right wing ^[9].

An Amicable Divorce?

While Trump and a Germany led by the status quo would continue shaking hands and throwing punches at the same time, a right-wing win in the upcoming German elections could improve the alliance. Culturally, the rising right wing AfD in Germany aligns in values with the right-wing powers in Washington. For example, the “America First” and the “Germany first” agendas share goals on controlling immigration, promoting onshore industry, decreasing subsidies for expensive renewable energy projects, and bringing the Ukraine war to a swift end.  Furthermore, Trump’s allies — and specifically his righthand man and tech billionaire Elon Musk — have signalled support for the AfD. Likewise, many prominent AfD members cheered on Trump’s victory, highlighting a newfound synergy between the Trump/Musk team and AfD leadership. For example, both the AfD and the Trump administration have promoted diplomatic solutions for the end of the Ukraine War, though the AfD — characterized by many media outlets as “pro-Russian” — has taken a sterner stance by advocating for a withdrawal of German military aid to the eastern European nation. Otherwise, both promote nationalist platforms that prioritise their home country’s wellbeing over alliances and multi-national organisations. But, paradoxically, their nationalistic platforms, which historically weaken alliances, may be what brings Germany and the U.S. closer together by preserving their cultural alignment while achieving their independent political aims. A more nationalist Germany might welcome a reduced American footprint in Europe, not out of ill will but rather because of a shared vision of wanting to move toward national independence  and away from cumbersome multinational organizations. 

Germany and the U.S. may soon enter into a paradoxical relationship in the wake of the upcoming German elections. Could a more nationalist Germany under the AfD actually improve its relations with the U.S. by keeping a healthy distance between “America First” and “Germany First” policies? The American truism that “good fences make good neighbors” could prove true with a more independent Germany, elevating the U.S.-German relationship to one of equals. If the same spirit of the Trump movement emerges victorious via the AfD in Germany, an amicable divorce may just be the best thing for Germany, the U.S., and the West.