Muslim Bro-Codes: A Rising Influence 

​As Western societies alienate young men, Islamic cultural norms are beginning to fill the void.​

Muhammad Hijab. Photo: Muhammad Hijab / YouTube

Muhammad Hijab. Photo: Muhammad Hijab / YouTube

The great irony of modern Europe is that it has embraced sweeping critiques of its old cultural norms; this happens to occur at the very time when immigration has filled the continent with people anchored in more traditional ways of life. 

Nowhere is this contrast so stark as in the discourse around gender—and it’s Muslims in particular that have become synonymous in the public imagination with the rejection of feminist and post-modern de-constructions of masculinity.

If a young man has a taste for hard-lines, moral absolutes, or wants to rebel against cultural relativism, Islam provides an obvious avenue. Christian churches, for their part, are as affected by progressivism as any Western institution and can lack counter-cultural appeal.

Celebrating Masculinity

Andrew Tate, who is in some sense the principal representative of the Western adoption of Islam as rebellion, expressed this pragmatically:

“Islam is the last religion on Earth...God to me is strong, God to me is something to be feared, God to me is something that people are afraid to mock...God to me has red lines...God to me represents the Islamic faith.”

But the masculine appeal goes beyond the fact that Muslims happen to remain committed to their tradition in a way others often no longer are. Cambridge University professor Tim Winter—a softspoken, middle-aged scholar and very much not a “bro”—describes his conversion as a young man as accompanying burgeoning sexuality:

"In my teens I was sent off…on an exchange with a…family with four daughters…There was a moment when I saw peach juice running off the chin of one of these bathing beauties and I had a moment of realisation: the world is not just the consequence of material forces…”

Crucially, this also entailed rejecting the religion of his upbringing, 

“In a Christian context, sexuality is traditionally seen as a consequence of the Fall, but for Muslims, it is an anticipation of paradise…I was…converted to Islam...”

As young men adrift in the socially isolating city-scapes of modern Europe search for visions of masculine vigour, they are liable to come to similar conclusions. 

Da‘wah-Bros or Ethnic Resentment? 

The form this assertion ends up taking, however, can vary greatly. 

Tate has founded the Britain Restoring Underlying Values (BRUV) party, and positions himself as wanting to restore British tradition. 

In contrast, Mohammad Hijab, a British Muslim with a substantial online following, takes an opposite approach. His critiques of European liberalism, defence of an often-literalist version of Islam, and calls for Islam’s expansion via immigration and immigrant birthrates rather than native conversion, cast the faith as a force displacing local culture, more tribal conquest than religious proselytism:

“If we increase our birthrates, Muslims can be assured to be 10% of Britain and 20% of France (population) in 2050 despite any policy changes in immigration. We are not the Zionist lobby, our strength is not in our ability to influence politicians, our strength is in our numbers.”

Such rhetoric can catalyse a reaction on a continent where anti-immigration politics are on the rise. And yet, some studies suggest favourable views of Muslims in Europe.

Even among supporters of so-called “populist” Right-wing parties, the percentage who have unfavourable views of Muslims is not as high as might be expected:

Islam as Rebellion

But Tate’s belief in strength and Winter’s conversion-by-eros aside, the ethnic-divide invoked by Hijab remains clear. Conversions to Islam in Europe are relatively rare. Information is spotty, but in 2011, a study by the Faith Matters think-tank suggested the number of converts in the UK could be as high as 100,000, with a possible 5,000 new conversions each year. France and Germany apparently have a similar number of total local converts. However, there is also evidence for high apostasy rates from Islam in Europe. 

And yet, the cultural impact is undeniable. In urban settings, this manifests in youth subcultures that are often not explicitly religious but take on Islamic terminology. Young men in the West End can be heard using terms like “haram” to refer to something forbidden, for instance.

The Muslim “bro,” then, might not necessarily be a thorough-going Muslim, but exists as a cultural category, using Islam as a pose, a gesture of rebellion. 

As Olivier Roy wrote in a 2015 Le Monde article, what the West is seeing is “...not a revolt of Islam or of Muslims…It is not the radicalisation of Islam, but the Islamisation of radicalism." 

Islam’s appeal in the West is more cultural than theological, largely owing to its being less diluted by modern and post-modern ideas. In particular, given that Islam is less suspicious of sexuality than historic Christianity, it can serve as a symbol for young men rebelling against the pathologising of masculinity.

Statement:

In some parts of the West, Islamic culture is providing young men with an alternative to progressive critiques of masculinity. The rise of the “Muslim bro” reflects Islam’s role as a countercultural force. While conversion rates remain low, Islamic terminology and values increasingly permeate Western youth subcultures. Islam serves as a rebellious aesthetic in the face of shifting gender norms, even influencing those who adopt it more as culture than faith.