Christianity in China: a Socio-Political Challenger? 

In October 2024, Pope Francis renewed the 2018 agreement with China by which the Vatican accepts bishops directly nominated by Chinese authorities. This agreement questions the place and status of Christianism in China. 

A brief look back at history. While Christian missionaries first arrived in China shortly after the sixth century, large-scale missionary activity only began with the arrival of the Jesuits in the late 1500s. At that time, due to their openness to other cultures, Chinese elites largely welcomed these Christian missionaries. The latter learned Chinese, adopted Confucian customs, and presented Christianity as a philosophical system compatible with Confucianism. As a result, the imperial authorities and scholarly class viewed the Jesuits not as religious agitators but as intellectuals who could contribute to the state.

This happy state of affairs took a turn for the worse in 1704, when Pope Clement XI condemned these adapted Chinese rites, effectively forbidding Chinese converts from persisting in their tradition of ancestor worship. The decision fundamentally altered the perception of missionaries among Chinese elites. No longer seen merely as learned scholars, they came to be viewed as agents of a foreign power seeking to undermine China’s political philosophy and social harmony.

Chinese political thought is rooted in the Tianxia (all under heaven) system, which dictates that the Emperor, as holder of the Mandate of Heaven, is responsible for maintaining harmony and order. This ideology posits that foreign entities must acknowledge the supremacy of Chinese civilization to be integrated into society. The existence of a religious authority that does not recognise the Emperor’s supremacy threatens this order. If such an authority were to gain a foothold, it could lead to internal divisions, eroding the legitimacy of the Emperor and justifying rebellion against the dynasty.

This suspicion intensified following the Second Opium War (1856–1860), which was triggered in part by the execution of a Catholic priest by Chinese authorities. The war gave Britain and France the pretext they sought to force further concessions from China, including provisions in the Treaty of Tianjin (1858) that imposed religious freedom. In the Chinese political consciousness, this translated into an existential challenge: alternative social and political models to Confucianism had now been legitimised by external forces, potentially undermining Chinese sovereignty.

Christianity and the Modern Chinese State

Today, Catholics comprise 0.34% of the Chinese population, while Protestants account for 2.19%. Though numerically small, these communities are perceived not as a security threat in terms of territorial concentration—unlike Muslim communities—but rather as a philosophical challenge to the ideological foundation of the Communist Party.

The ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has, therefore, enacted legislation aimed at controlling religious practices. The paramount concern for Beijing remains state cohesion, a challenge exacerbated by the fragmentation following the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911. Like all foreign religious influences, Christianity is subjected to a process of Sinicisation, a strategy historically used to neutralise external cultural threats.

Since 2016, all religious practices must align with the ideological framework of the Communist Party. This has resulted in significant alterations to religious rituals, church architecture, and even modifications to biblical passages to fit within an acceptable Chinese context. For example, in the new, politically approved version of the Gospel of St John, Jesus stones to death the woman who committed adultery, instead of forgiving her. Clergy—including priests and imams—must undergo state-approved training, pledge allegiance to the Communist Party, and integrate state policies into their teachings. The ”Administrative Measures for Religious Clergy”, enacted in May 2021, formalised these requirements. Additionally, religious education for minors is heavily restricted, underscoring the state’s determination to prevent any alternative centers of authority from challenging its ideological monopoly.

Religion as a Political Question

In China, Christianity is not viewed primarily as a religious issue but as a political challenge. Allowing unregulated Christianity would mean tolerating a potential ideological competitor to the Confucian-Communist state model. This perception is shaped by two key lessons drawn from both ancient and modern Chinese history. 

Chinese leaders, particularly current President Xi Jinping, have long emphasised the importance of centralisation in governance. Xi’s consolidation of power within the CCP reflects his commitment to strengthening the Party’s control over all aspects of society—including foreign religions. His leadership draws historical parallels with the Qin Dynasty, known for its capacity to impose order, centralise authority, and eliminate internal division. To maintain national stability, Xi has repeatedly stressed that the Party’s dominance must remain unquestioned.

The Fear of External Influence

Modern Chinese leadership also sees Christianity through the lens of the Cold War. The CCP believes that Catholicism, under Pope John Paul II, played a role in the collapse of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. The fear of a similar fate for the CCP remains palpable, particularly as the Pope is not only a religious figure but also a head of state, raising sovereignty concerns for Beijing. To counter this, the CCP has doubled down on Sinicisation as a means of ensuring that religious institutions remain firmly under state control.

As a result, China today has two Catholic clergies: An official clergy sanctioned by the state and controlled through the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association, and an underground clergy, loyal to the Vatican and viewed as a potential political threat. The state actively suppresses this group through surveillance, arrests, and restrictions on worship. From a Western perspective, the status of Christianity in China may appear as a conflict between religious freedom and authoritarian control. However, this framing overlooks the fact that, historically, even in Europe, it took centuries for political powers to accept that religious institutions did not inherently threaten their legitimacy. 

Statement

Christianity’s future in China will likely depend on when—and if—Chinese leadership ceases to view it as a political rival. Until then, the Chinese Communist Party will continue its efforts to control, sinicise, and, where necessary, suppress Christianity to maintain its ideological monopoly over Chinese society.