A New Cold War Pope?

“Peace be with you all!” With these words, Pope Leo XIV opened his pontificate on 8 May 2025, anchoring his first appearance on the Loggia of St Peter’s Basilica in the language of peace. The phrase was repeated eight times in his address. It signalled a programme. At a time when the global order teeters on the brink, Leo XIV has chosen to frame his mission not in terms of rupture or reform, but reconciliation.

On his first Sunday as Bishop of Rome, Pope Leo XIV stood with with unmistakable conviction. “May everything possible be done,” he pleaded, “to reach an authentic, just and lasting peace” in Ukraine. He called for the release of prisoners and the return of children to their families. On the war in Gaza, he called for a swift end to hostilities and the release of Israeli hostages. He reinforced his appeal with the slogan: “Never again war!” It became clear that the Easter greeting which had inaugurated the pontificate was, in fact, an ambition: to reclaim peace in a multipolar world.

In the case of Ukraine in particular, a clear shift in emphasis became apparent. Pope Francis had maintained a policy of equidistance in the confrontation between Moscow and Kyiv—a stance that drew widespread criticism for allegedly downplaying the Russian invasion. At the heart of this approach lay a diplomatic doctrine rooted in the tradition of Ostpolitik. This pragmatic line did not only shape the Vatican’s stance on Ukraine, but also played a significant role in the controversial agreement with China.

Realpolitik Reconsidered

No one embodied this foreign policy course more clearly than Cardinal Secretary of State Pietro Parolin, who played a leading role in shaping the Vatican’s diplomatic agenda under Pope Francis. He entered the conclave as the frontrunner—and, as so often happens to favourites, emerged as a cardinal once again. Parolin may have lost the power struggle. This is a sign that a different wind may soon be blowing through the Vatican. His services, however, are still needed—on the one hand, to pick up the pieces; on the other, to keep rival powers in check. As president of the Casa Nazareth, a conservative Catholic foundation focused on traditional family values and pastoral outreach, Parolin currently serves as a counterweight to the progressive, at times overtly “woke” influences emanating from the Sant’Egidio Community.

The new pope is American, an Augustinian, and a man with the mien of a reconciler. But Leo XIV is not another Francis. Nor is he merely a theological continuation of Benedict XVI. His early statements suggest something else: a papacy that could recalibrate the Vatican’s geopolitical role after years of cautious equidistance. It is too early to speak of a “Cold War Pope”, but echoes of Karol Wojtyła’s moral defiance are already resonating through Rome—in a world reshaped by China, Russia and Western uncertainty. Unlike the two transitional pontiffs before him, the younger Leo is markedly better positioned to pursue a long-term foreign policy strategy—something not seen at the Vatican since the days of the Polish pope.

Even before his pontificate, Robert Prevost had made his position clear. In a 2022 interview, he described Russia’s war as “imperialist in nature” and underscored the seizure of territory as a naked exercise in power. It was, he said bluntly, a “real invasion.” As pope, Prevost is likely to adopt a more restrained tone. But the role of a reconciler is not that of a pacifist. By invoking the notion of a “just peace,” he has made it clear that such peace cannot come at Ukraine’s expense.

Not an anti-Trump, but an anti-Xi pontificate?

That the new pope is an American was interpreted by some media outlets as an attempt to install a counterweight to Donald Trump. In reality, however, according to reports in the Italian press, it was the Asian cardinals who viewed the election of an American as a strategic move—a signal aimed at curbing China’s growing power.

China’s influence over the Catholic Church—embodied in the controversial Vatican-Beijing accord—remains a thorn. The 2018 Sino-Vatican agreement, has been repeatedly flouted by Beijing. In the interregnum following Francis’s death, China unilaterally appointed bishops without even feigning papal consent, while state-controlled Catholic websites swiftly removed coverage of the pontiff’s passing. Meanwhile, Rome remained conspicuously silent as loyalist bishops replaced clerics deemed disobedient by the regime—many of whom remain under surveillance or house arrest.

At the same time, Beijing enacted sweeping new restrictions on foreign religious activity. These prohibit foreigners from engaging with unregistered (“underground”) churches, bar joint worship with locals, and tightly control the import and distribution of religious material. Even officially sanctioned rites must be conducted in isolation and under state oversight. These measures form part of the Communist Party’s broader “sinicisation” campaign—a concerted effort to subordinate religious life to party authority.

Statement

The world of John Paul II was marked by bipolarity; Leo inherits a multipolar landscape—an entirely different field. While a sudden foreign-policy shift is unlikely, given some continuity within the Curia, Prevost’s stance on the Ukraine war and cardinals’ expectations regarding China suggest a more assertive Vatican is only a matter of time. Beijing’s growing repression may soon compel Rome to speak with greater clarity. Leo—the new lion—will have to roar, if only to keep the wolves at bay. That imperative extends well beyond the plight of persecuted Christians in China to embattled believers around the globe.