Iran’s "Broad Church": Ready for War? 

Tehran’s regional power rests on the so-called “Axis of Resistance,”—a network of ideological fellow-travellers drawn together by their opposition to US and Israeli interests.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) began supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon in the 1980s, Yemen’s Ansar Allah (the Houthis) around 2011, and Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) since their emergence in June 2014 during the struggle against ISIS.

Across these alliances, Iran prioritises shared objectives over strict sectarian conformity. Even Hamas, which is Sunni, has enjoyed Iranian support (subject to fraying during the Arab Spring but strengthened since the start of the Gaza War).

The Limits of Expansive Shiism

In terms of actual states, apart from Iraq, whose parliament formally incorporated the PMF into the state’s security apparatus in 2016, Iran’s main regional ally was Syria. 

Tehran’s religious authorities recognised Syria’s Alawites as Shiites as far back as the 1970s—despite theological differences—to draw the Assads closer. This is not unlike the expansion of the “Shiite” label to include the Houthis, who are Zaydis (a sect as distinct from Shiism as Sunnism).

But the use of Shiism as a geopolitical front has since broken down.

Bashar al-Assad strayed by staying neutral on Gaza, curbing IRGC’s operations and tolerating Israeli strikes on Iranian assets in Syria, while pivoting towards the Gulf States. After his ouster, the already degraded “Shiite Crescent” (Iraq, Syria and Lebanon) ceased to exist entirely, depriving Iran of its land-bridge to Hezbollah.

On the other hand, recent years have seen Iran normalise relations with the region's major Sunni power, Saudi Arabia. The rivals restored diplomatic relations in 2023 through a China-mediated deal. Indeed, they walk parallel paths: just as Iran’s united “Shiite” front lost Assad, Muhammad bin-Salman has been trying to wean his country off of its dependence on Salafi proxies. In addition, Saudi Arabia had reason to prefer a regional balance that includes Iran, in whose absence the monarchy will be reduced to a subordinate position vis-a-vis Israel (and maybe Turkey). 

However, given the amount of investment promised by Washington following Trump’s recent participation in the Gulf Summit, it is likely Saudi Arabia will simply support the US and Israel in a coming war.

Proxy Power

This war would see Iran’s proxies opening multiple fronts, although their specific capabilities are hard to determine, given that estimates of the amount of fighters they have at their disposal vary wildly:

First there is Hezbollah, a hybrid organisation with political and military wings. It holds seats in Lebanon’s parliament and is socially entrenched. Its paramilitary arm is seasoned in asymmetric warfare and makes use of advanced drones. However, the group has been severely degraded by Israeli attacks throughout 2024, losing its higher leadership echelons. Still, in a wider conflict, Hezbollah could open up a northern front using long-range rockets and drones.

The Houthis in Yemen control crucial territory—including ports—and have demonstrated their capacity to disrupt international trade in the Red Sea. Supplied by Iran through an “air bridge” to Hudaydah since 2012, they can launch missiles and UAVs targeting Israel and commercial shipping. In a broader war, the Houthis could intensify these assaults, diverting international navies to counter them.

Finally, the Iraqi PMF has claimed responsibility for drone strikes on Haifa and, should conflict erupt, could threaten US bases in Iraq and Syria and even target Israel, though their resilience under sustained counter-strikes remains uncertain.

All three proxies have been degraded by Israeli or US air campaigns in recent years, however, and all depend on Iranian support, whereas Tehran’s current financial strain—exacerbated by sanctions—limits its capacity to bolster these groups. 

Once war breaks out, Israel would face multiple fronts, while having to account for dwindling resources and needing a complicated strategic plan to see it through. Beyond this, internationally, sustained Houthi disruptions in the Red Sea and an Iranian stranglehold on the Straits of Hormuz would trigger global trade repercussions, including a rise in oil prices. 

But these groups would not be able to sustain intense attacks for long. The result would likely be a long-term region-wide simmering conflict, with precedents in the US occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Short-Term Victory, Long-Term Conflict

Iran’s “broad church” of proxies could unleash multi-front attacks—but its degraded state and delicate supply chains mean they cannot engage in sustained large-scale operations, making a prolonged, yet low-intensity conflict the better option. 

Meanwhile, the Israeli economy would contract, prospects for long-term diplomatic stability in the region would erode, world trade would suffer from disrupted shipping and higher oil prices, and the US would have to reckon with another case of war fatigue.

Simmering asymmetrical warfare would be the end result, as the region would likely consider pivoting towards Beijing's more stable-seeming foreign policy, displacing the US.

Israeli hegemony will have its season, therefore, with its regional heft diplomatically and militarily guaranteed by the US—but this will be short-lived.

Statement

Iran’s “broad church” foreign policy—uniting disparate Shia and even Sunni actors under the “Axis of Resistance”—has enabled Tehran to project power across the Middle East. Yet as sectarian lines blur and key alliances fray, this strategy reveals its limits. Should war erupt with Israel and the US, Iran’s proxies could open multiple fronts, threatening regional stability and global trade. However, economic constraints mean Tehran cannot sustain a large-scale campaign. The likelier outcome is a drawn-out, low-intensity conflict that destabilises the region, disrupts oil routes, and leaves Israel ascendant—but locked into a fragile and temporary hegemony.